We give the first communication-optimal document exchange protocol. For any n and k < n our randomized hashing scheme takes any n-bit file F and computes a Θ(k log n k )-bit summary from which one can reconstruct F given a related file F ′ with edit distance ED(F, F ′ ) ≤ k with high probability.
The size of our summary is information-theoretically order optimal for all values of k, positively answering a longstanding open question of Orlitsky. It also is the first non-trivial solution for the interesting setting where a small constant fraction of symbols have been edited, producing an optimal summary of size O(H(δ)n) for k = δn. This concludes a long series of better-and-better protocols which produce larger summaries for sub-linear values of k and subpolynomial failure probabilities. In particular, the recent break-through of [2, Belazzougui, Zhang; FOCS '16] assumes that k < n ε , produces a summary of size O(k log 2 k + k log n), and succeeds with probability 1 − (k log n)
−O (1) .
We also give an efficient derandomization of a much simpler document exchange protocol with a larger summary size of O(k log 2 n k ). This 1 improves, for any k, over a deterministic document exchange protocol by Belazzougui [1] with summary size O(k 2 + k log 2 n). Our deterministic document exchange directly provides new efficient systematic error correcting codes for insertions and deletions. These (binary) codes correct any ε fraction of adversarial insertions/deletions while having a rate of 1 − O(ε log 
Introduction
This paper gives the first efficient hashing schemes for the document exchange problem which produces an order optimal summary size. Our efficient randomized hashing scheme takes any nbit file F and for any k computes an optimal sized O(k log n k )-bit summary from which one can reconstruct F given a related file F ′ with edit distance 2 ED(F, F ′ ) ≤ k. Document exchange, or remote data synchronization, is an important problem in practice that frequently occurs when synchronizing files across computer systems or maintaining replicated data collections over a bandwidth limited network. In the simplest version it consists of two machines that each hold a copy of an n-bit file F ′ where on one machine this file may have been updated to F . When updating the data on the other machine one would ideally like to only send information about their differences instead of sending the whole file F . This is particularly important because network bandwidth and data transfer times are limiting factors in most applications and F often differs little from F ′ , e.g., only a small number k of changes have been applied or a small fraction of the content has been edited, i.e., k = δn for some small constant δ ∈ (0, 1). This "scenario arises in a number of applications, such as synchronization of user files between different machines, distributed file systems, remote backups, mirroring of large web and ftp sites, content distribution networks, or web access [over a slow network]" [15] .
One can imagine a multi-round protocol in which the two machines adaptively figure out which parts of the outdated file have not been changed and need not be transmitted. However, multi-round protocols are too costly and not possible in many settings. They incur long network round-trip times and if multiple machines need updating the a separate synchronization protocol needs to be run for each individual such machine. Surprisingly, Orlitsky [19] , who initiated the theoretical study of this problem in 1991, proved that the party knowing F can compute a short summary of Θ(k log n k ) bits which can then be used by any other party i knowing a file F ′ i , which differs from F by k potentially very different edits to recover F and the k edits that have been applied to obtain F from F ′ i . This is initially quite surprising especially because the summary is, up to constants, of equal size as a description of the unknown changes themselves. Indeed, an exchange of Ω(k log n k ) bits is information-theoretically necessary to describe the difference between two nbit strings of edit distance k. Unfortunately however, Orlitsky's result is merely existential and requires exponential time computations for recovery, which prevents the result to be of practical use. Pointing out several powerful potential applications, Orlitsky left the question of an efficient single-round document exchange protocol that matches the non-constructive O(k log n k ) summary size as an open question which has since inspired many theoretical and practical results working towards this goal. This paper solely focuses on such single-round document exchange schemes. For simplicity, like all other prior works, we furthermore assume that a good upper bound k on the edit distance ED(F, F ′ ) is known 3 .
In practice rsynch [22] has become a widely used tool to achieve efficient two-round document exchange / file synchronization while minimizing the amount of information sent. Rsynch is also used as a routine in the rdiff tool to efficiently compute changes between files, e.g., in version control systems. Many similar protocols have been suggested and implemented. Unfortunately rsynch and 2 The edit distance ED(F, F ′ ) between two strings F and F ′ is the minimal number of insertions, deletions, or symbol changes that transform one string into the other. 3 Alternatively starting with k = 1 and doubling k until the recovery was successful leads to the same amount of communication, up to a factor of two, since the summary size only depends linearly on k.
almost all other tools do not have any guarantees on the size of the data communicated and it is easy to give examples on which these algorithms perform extremely poorly. A notable exception is a scheme of Irmak, Mihaylov and Suel [15] .
On the theoretical side the protocol of [15] was the first computationally efficient single-round document exchange scheme with a provable guarantee on the size of a summary in terms of the edit distance k = ED(F, F ′ ) achieving a size of O(k log n k log n). Independently developed fuzzy extractors [9] can also be seen as providing a document exchange scheme for some k polynomially small in n. A randomized scheme by Jowhari [16] independently achieved a size of O(k log n log * n). In two recent break-throughs Chakraborty, Goldenberg, and Kouckỳ [6] designed a low distortion embedding from edit distance to hamming distance which can be used to get a summary of size Θ(k 2 log n) and Bellazougi and Zhang [2] further build on this randomized embedding and achieved a scheme with summary size Θ(k log 2 k + k log n) which is order optimal for 4 k = exp( √ log n). All of these schemes are randomized. The first deterministic scheme with summary size Θ(k 2 +k log 2 n) was given by Belazzougui [1] . All these document exchange schemes have some sub-linear restriction on the maximal magnitude of k. For example, the breakthrough result of [2] assumes that k < n ε for some sufficiently small constant ε > 0. In particular, there does not exist a scheme which works for the interesting case where the edit distance k is a small constant fraction δ of the file length, e.g., if 1% of the content has been edited.
Our Results
We positively answer the 27 year old open question of Orlitsky [19] and give an efficient randomized hashing scheme for the single-round document exchange problem which, for any k, produces a summary of order optimal size Θ(k log n k ).
Theorem 2.1. For any k > 0 there is a randomized algorithm, which given any n-bit string F produces a Θ(k log n k )-bit summary S F . There also is a deterministic recovery algorithm, which given S F and any string F ′ that is independent from the randomness used for computing S F and satisfies ED(F, F ′ ) ≤ k, recovers the string F with high probability, i.e., with probability 1 − n −O (1) .
This improves over the recent break-through of [2] which produces a summary of size Θ(k log 2 k + k log n) and works as long as k < n ε . We remark that the scheme in [2] has a failure probability which is polylogarithmic in n and polynomial in k whereas the scheme in Theorem 2.1 works with high probability. If one wants to boost the scheme in [2] to work with high probability one needs to send log n log k+log log n independent summaries making the overall summary size (up to a log log n for sub-logarithmic k) equal to Θ(k log k log n + k log 2 n log k ) = Ω(k log 1.5 n).
As a precursor to our main result we obtain a document exchange protocol with sub-optimal summary size that has the advantage that it can be efficiently derandomized. This gives a deterministic document exchange protocol with summary size Θ(k log 2 n k ), improving over the deterministic scheme by Belazzougui [1] with summary size Θ(k 2 + k log n).
Lemma 2.1.1. There is a deterministic document exchange algorithm, which given any any k > 0 and any n-bit string F produces a Θ(k log 2 n k )-bit summary S F , such that a deterministic recovery algorithm, which is given S F and any string F ′ with edit distance ED(F, F ′ ) ≤ k, recovers F .
The schemes from Theorem 2.1 and Lemma 2.1.1 are the first document exchange protocols which work for the interesting setting in which a constant fraction of edits need to be communicated. In particular, if the edit distance between F and F ′ is δn for some small constant δ > 0 then our optimal randomized scheme produces a summary of size Θ(nδ log 1/δ) = Θ(nH(δ)) ≪ n, where H(.) is the entropy function. Our deterministic scheme incurs another log 1 δ factor but the summary size of Θ(nδ log 2 1 δ ) is still much smaller than n for sufficiently small δ. Remarks:
• The deterministic document exchange from Lemma 2.1.1 was independently and simultaneously 5 discovered by Cheng, Jin, Li and Wu [7] . It remains an interesting open question whether Lemma 2.1.1 can be improved and whether an efficient deterministic document exchange with optimal summary size, matching Theorem 2.1, is possible. • Deterministic document exchange protocols are known to be equivalent to systematic error correcting codes for insertions and deletions. Lemma 2.1.1 and the improvements for error correcting codes in [7] lead to improved error correcting codes for insertions and deletions. We summarize these implications in Appendix B.
Hash Functions and Summary Structure
In this section we describe and define the simple inner-product hash functions used in our schemes and the content and structure of the summary S F of F . We start by giving some intuition about the summary structure in Section 3.1, give our string notation in Section 3.2, formally define our hash function in Section 3.3 and define our summary structure in Section 3.4.
Intuition for the Summary Structure
Essentially all document exchange algorithms used in practice, including rsynch, use the very natural idea of cutting the file F into blocks and sending across hashes of these blocks in order to identify which of these blocks are contained in F ′ without any edits.
Once identical blocks have been identified the remaining information containing all differences between F and F ′ is small and can be transmitted. The protocol of Irmak, Mihaylov and Suel [15] also follows this strategy. However, it does not use a fixed block length but uses log n k levels 6 of exponentially decreasing block length. This allows to progressively zoom into larger blocks containing some edits to identify smaller blocks within them that do not contain an edit. Given that higher levels should already identify large parts of the string F that are identical to F ′ and thus known to the party reconstructing F many of the hashes of lower levels will not be of interest to the party reconstructing F ′ . To avoid having to send these hashes one could run an adaptive multi-level protocol in which the reconstructing party provides feedback at each level. A great and much simpler single-round alternative introduced by [15] is to use (the non-systematic part of) systematic error correcting codes which allows the receiving party to efficiently reconstruct the hashes it is missing, without the sending party needing to know which hashes these are. The summary S F now simply consists of these encodings of hashes of all log n k levels and this summary 5 Both works were put on arxiv days apart [8, 12] . The author of this paper served on the program committee of FOCS'18, where [8] was published, and was as such not permitted to submit his work there. 6 All logarithms in this paper are with respect to basis two unless stated otherwise.
can be sent to the reconstructing party in a single-round document exchange protocol. Given that at most ED(F, F ′ ) blocks can be corrupted in each level the summary size is Θ(k log n k · o) where o is the size of a single hash. Using randomized o = Θ(log n)-bit hashes with Θ(log n)-bit seeds which are guaranteed to be correct with high probability leads to the Θ(k log n k · log n) bit summary size of [15] .
The hashing schemes in this paper mostly follow the same practical framework. In fact, the summary structure we use for our simpler (sub-optimal deterministic) document exchange protocol with summary size Θ(k log 2 n k ) is identical to [15] except that we use a smaller hash size o = Θ(log n k ) and a compact way to describe the randomness used for hashing, which can then also be used for derandomization. Our main result further reduces the hash size o to merely a fixed constant. This requires an much more robust recovery algorithm which can deal with high hash collision probabilities. In particular, since the failure probability of a hash is exponential in the hash size o, choosing o = log n as in [15] implies that no hash collision happens with high probability and choosing o = log n k still keep the expected number of hash collisions at O(k), that is, at the same order of magnitude as the errors one has to deal with anyway. The fact that recovery from constant size hashes with a constant failure probability is even existentially possible requires a much more intricate probabilistic analysis. Furthermore, the key trick used in [1, 8, 15 ] to use error correcting codes to obliviously communicate the missing or incorrect hashes in each round inherently requires Θ(k log n k )-bits to be sent in each of the log n k levels. This forms another serious barrier that needs to be overcome for our main result.
String Notation
Next we briefly give the string notation we use throughout.
Let S ∈ Σ * be a string. We denote with |S| the length of S and for any i, j ∈ [1, |S|] with i ≤ j we denote with S[i, j] the substring of S between the i th and j th symbol, both included. A substring of S is always a set of consecutive symbols in S, i.e., any string of the form S[i, j]. We also use multi-dimensional arrays of symbols, in which every index typically begins with 0. An array position H[i, j] with i, j ∈ N 0 can either contain a symbol over some alphabet Σ ′ or be empty. Table R Next we describe our hash function hash, which computes nothing more than some F 2 -innerproducts between its input string and some random bits.
To properly keep track of the randomness used we will think of the randomness being supplied by a three dimensional table of bits we call R. We remark that our algorithms do not actually need to instantiate or compute R explicitly. Instead the description of the bits contained in R will be so simple that they can be generated, stored, or computed on the spot when needed.
In addition to the string S ∈ Σ * to be hashed we supply four more arguments to hash. A call like hash o R (S, s, ℓ) produces a hash of the string S ∈ Σ * using the randomness table R. The parameter o ∈ N denotes the size of the hash, i.e., number of bits that are produced as an output. The parameters s and ℓ denote to which starting position and level the hash belongs to, respectively. These parameters are used to describe where in the randomness table R to pull the randomness for the inner product from. This ensures firstly that hashes for different levels and intervals use different or "fresh" random bits and secondly that summary creation and recovery consistently use the same parts of R when testing whether two strings stem from the same interval in the original string F . The inner product computed by hash o R (S, s, ℓ) is now simply the o-bit string h 1 , . . . , h o for which
Note that if R is filled with independent and uniformly distributed bits we have that any two non-identical strings have colliding hashes with probability 2 −o , i.e.,
The reason for this is that each of the o output bits independently is an inner product between the string to be hashed and the same uniformly random bit string of length |S| taken from R. Therefore the difference between h i and h ′ i is the inner product of a uniformly random string and a non-zero string and as such a uniformly distributed bit. The probability that each of the o output bits is zero is now exactly 2 −o .
Lastly, we add one further simplification to our hash function which is that if the output length o is larger than the length |S| of the string S to be hashed then hash o R (S, s, ℓ) simply outputs S as a "hash", possibly padded with zeros. This gives a collision probability of zero for any two same-length strings with length at most o and allows to read off the string S from its hash.
Summary Structure and Construction
In this section we formally describe and define the summary structure and construction which follows the informal description given in Section 3.1:
The summary algorithm takes the string F it wants to summarize, the parameter k which essentially governs how many hashes are provided per level (in coded form) and the parameter o which determines the hash size of the hashes used. For simplicity of the description we assume that the length n = |F | of the string F equals 4k · 2 L for some integer L, i.e., n is a multiple of 4k and n 4k is a power of two. This assumption is without loss of generality. One can send the length of F along with the summary and, for the hash computations, extend F to a string of the length 4k · 2 m , with L = ⌈log 2 n 4k ⌉, by adding zeros to the end. The recovery algorithm simply adds the same number of zeros to F ′ during the recovery and removes them again in the end.
The summary S F contains the following coded hashes organized into L + 1 levels:
• The level zero simply cuts F into 4k equal size pieces and records the hashes for each piece. I.e., let ∀i ∈ [0, 4k
and we include H[0, .], which consists of ko bits, in the summary.
• For level ℓ ∈ [1, L] we cut F into 4k · 2 ℓ equal size pieces, compute the hash for each piece to form H[ℓ, .]. The hashes themself however are too large to be sent completely. Instead our (warm-up) deterministic scheme encodes these hashes using an error correcting code C j which is simply the non-systematic part of a systematic linear [4k2 ℓ + 100k, 4k2 ℓ , 11k] error correcting code over F 2 o . Such a code exists and many explicit constructions based on algebraic geometry are known if o = Θ(log n/k). Our optimal document exchange protocol with o = Θ(1) requires a more sophisticated scheme which we describe in Section 4. In addition to these coded hashes the summary S F also contains the length |F | and a compact description of the randomness table R. Throughout this paper we will use the ε-biased probability spaces of Naor and Naor [18] for this compact description. In particular, we prove for all our schemes that the bits in R do not need to be independent uniform bits but that it suffices if they are sampled from a distribution with reasonably small bias. The often exploited fact that a sample point from an ε-biased distribution over n O(1) bits can be described by only O(log 1 ε + log n) bits allows us to give very compact descriptions of the randomness used and send these along in the summary S F . In particular, we do not need to assume that the summary construction and the summary recovery algorithm have any shared source of randomness.
Recovery Algorithms
This section describes our recovery algorithms. We start in Section 4.1 by defining hash induced substring matchings, which form the basis for our algorithms and their analysis. We then describe our recovery algorithms. In Section 4.2 we first describe a randomized algorithm which produces a summary of size Θ(k log 2 n k ). This is a good warm-up for our main result. It demonstrates the overall algorithmic structure common to both our recovery algorithms, introduces the basic probabilistic analysis used to analyze them, and makes it easier to understand the problems that need to be addressed when pushing both the algorithmic ideas and the analysis to the limit for our main result. We also show in the appendix how to derandomize this scheme to obtain Lemma 2.1.1. Lastly, Section 4.2.2 contains the order optimal randomized hashing scheme which uses constant size hashes and thus achieves the optimal summary size of Θ(k log n k ).
Hash Induced Substring Matchings
For every n, k, ℓ we say that two index sequences
• all i-indices are starting points of blocks that got hashed in
, and • hashes of the strings in blocks that are matched are identical (we also say the hashes are matching), i.e., for all j ∈ [1,
In the rare instances where we (temporarily) relax this requirement we speak of a non-proper matching.
Furthermore, we call such a matching
• disjoint if intervals that are matched in F ′ are not overlapping, i.e., we have for every j,
• bad or k ′ -bad if for every matched blocks in F and F ′ the actual strings are non-identical (despite having identical hashes), i.e., if for all
Note that a monotone matching is k-plausible if it can be explained by at most k insertion and deletion operations.
We generally assume all our matchings to be proper, monotone, and disjoint and often omit these qualifiers. Whenever we talk about non-necessarily monotone, not-necessarily proper or notnecessarily non-disjoint matchings we explicitly label these matchings at non-disjoint, non-proper and/or non-monotone. Furthermore, if the context allows it we sometimes omit mentioning the strings F, F ′ , the hash function hash o R , or the level ℓ with respect to which a matching satisfies the above conditions. For any two strings F, F ′ one can compute a monotone matching of maximum size in time linear in the length of the strings n and polynomial in k using a standard dynamic program. The same is true for a maximum size disjoint, bad, or k-plausible monotone matching. It is furthermore likely that using the same techniques which transforms the standard O(nk) dynamic program for edit distance into an O(n + k 2 ) dynamic program [23] can also be used to obtain O(n + k O(1) ) algorithms for the above maximum monotone matching variants as well.
Algorithm 1: Simple Level-wise Recovery
Algorithm 1 Simple Recovery with o = Θ(log n k ) and Summary Size O(k log
] ← guesses for level ℓ + 1 hashes using M ℓ and F ′ 5:
Our first recovery algorithm, which we call Simple Level-wise Recovery, is now easily given (see also the pseudo-code description of this algorithm, which is given as Algorithm 1):
Assume that the recovery algorithm has recovered all 4k · 2 ℓ hashes H F [ℓ, .] of F at level ℓ correctly. Initially ℓ = 0 and this assumption is trivially true because these hashes are included in the summary S F . Equipped with these 4k · 2 ℓ hashes the algorithm finds the largest monotone disjoint matching between the level ℓ blocks in F and blocks in F ′ of the same length. The recovery algorithm now guesses the level ℓ + 1 hashes H F [ℓ + 1, .] of F using M ℓ and F ′ as follows: Each block of F in level ℓ splits into exactly two blocks in level ℓ + 1. For any block in F that is matched to a sub-string in F ′ with an identical hash the recovery algorithm guesses that the strings in these blocks are also identical and computes the hashes for the two sub-blocks in level ℓ + 1 by applying hash o R to the appropriate sub-string in F ′ . If a block in F is not matched one can fill in something arbitrarily as a guess or mark it as an erasure. The hope is that the vector of hashesH F [ℓ + 1, .] for level ℓ + 1 guessed in this way is close in Hamming distance to the correct hashes H F [ℓ + 1, .]. If this is the case, concatenatingH F (ℓ + 1, .) with the redundancy Enc ℓ+1 for level ℓ + 1 from S F and decoding this to the closest codeword in C ℓ correctly recovers the level ℓ + 1 hashes H F [ℓ + 1, .] and allows the algorithm go proceed to the next iteration and level. In this way the recovery algorithm iteratively recovers the hashes for every level one by one until level L. In level L blocks are of constant size and hash o R becomes the (padded) identity function such that one can read off F from H F [L, .].
Correctness of Algorithm 1 and k-Bad Matchings
In this subsection we give a sufficient condition for the correctness of Algorithm 1. In particular, we prove that if there is no k-bad self-matching in F , i.e., a size-k bad monotone disjoint matching, between F and itself under hash o R , then Algorithm 1 recovers F correctly. Later in Section ?? we then show that hashes of size o = Ω(log n k ) and only little randomness in R are sufficient to make the existence of such a witness unlikely, in fact, so little randomness that one can easily derandomize the algorithm.
To prove the correctness of Algorithm 1 we will argue that the matching computed in each level is sufficiently large and, in the absence of a k-bad self-matching, of sufficient quality to allow the recovery of the hashes for the next level using the redundancy in S F . This allows the recovery algorithm then to proceed similarly with the next level.
It is easy to see that the matching computed is always large assuming that F and F ′ are not too different:
Lemma 4.0.1. Assuming that the hashes for level ℓ were correctly recovered, Algorithm 1 computes a matching of size at least 4k
Proof. Since F and F ′ differ by only ED(F, F ′ ) insertion, deletions, or symbol corruptions and since each such edit can affect at most one block we know that we can look at the monotone matching which matches all blocks in F which did not suffer from such an edit to its identical sub-string in F ′ . Since the hashes were correctly recovered and the hashes use the same parts of R to compute the inner-producet hashes this is a valid monotone matching of size 4k · 2 l − ED(F, F ′ ). Since Algorithm 1 computes the largest valid matching it finds a matching of at least this size.
We would like to say that if in the summary S F random enough hash functions with a small enough collision probability are used, which usually stemming from a sufficiently unbiased R and a large enough hash output length o, then most of the matching pairs computed by Algorithm 1 are correct, i.e., correspond to sub-strings of F and F ′ that are identical under hash o R with the randomness R used. For any matching which contains too many pairs of substrings which are not-identical but have the same hashes we abstract out a witness which explains why hash o R failed. For this we focus on bad matching pairs that go between non-identical intervals in F and F ′ which do not contain any edits. This however is exactly a k-bad selfmatching in F . The advantage of looking at such a witness is that its existence only depends on S F (or hash o R , R and F ) but not on F ′ .
Lemma 4.0.2. Assume that the hashes for level i were correctly recovered and that for level ℓ there is no k-bad matching of F to itself under hash o R . Then the monotone matching computed by Algorithm 1 for this level matches at most ED(F, F ′ ) + k non-identical blocks in F and F ′ .
Proof. F and F ′ differ by only ED(F, F ′ ) insertion, deletions, or symbol corruptions and each such edit can affect at most one of the blocks in F ′ that are matched to a non-identical block in F . Therefore there are at most ED(F, F ′ ) such matches in the monotone matching computed by Algorithm 1. Furthermore, if we restrict ourselves to the matches between non-identical sub-strings in F and F ′ computed by Algorithm 1 which are not of this type it is true that each of these matches comes from matching a sub-string in F to a sub-string in F ′ which, due to having no edits in it, is identical do a sub-string in F . Since, by assumption, Algorithm 1 used the correctly recovered level ℓ hashes and computes a monotone disjoint matching these matches form a bad matching in F . By assumption this matching can be of size at most k giving the desired bound of at most ED(F, F ′ ) + k non-identical blocks matched in F and F ′ by Algorithm 1
Lastly, because we use error correcting codes with sufficiently large distance we can easily correct for the k missing hashes and 2k incorrect hashes. Proof. We will first show by induction on the level ℓ that Algorithm 1 correctly recovers the level ℓ hashes H F [ℓ, .] of F that were computed for S F . For level ℓ = 0 this is trivial because these hashes are a part of S F and therefore given to Algorithm 1 as an input. For the induction step we want to show that the hashes for level ℓ + 1 will be correctly recovered assuming that this has successfully happened for the hashes for level ℓ. Here Lemma 4.0.1 guarantees that a matching of size 4k · 2 l − ED(F, F ′ ) is computed which results in at most k = ED(F, F ′ ) blocks in the level ℓ of F having no match and therefore at most 2k hashes in level ℓ + 1 are assigned the erasure symbol "?" in the guessing step of Algorithm 1. Furthermore, the assumptions for Lemma 4.0.2 are satisfied guaranteeing that at most ED(F, F ′ ) + k = 2k of the matchings computed by Algorithm 1 in level ℓ belong to non-identical strings in F and F ′ . This results in at most 4k of the hash values computed in the guessing step of Algorithm 1 being incorrect. The Hamming distance between the correct hashes H F [i + 1, .] and the estimateH F [i + 1, .] produced by Algorithm 1 is therefore at most 6k. Given that the error correcting code used has distance 13k these errors will be corrected leading to a correct recovery of the level ℓ + 1 hashes in Step 5 of Algorithm 1. In its last iteration Algorithm 1 will correctly recover the level L hashes H F [L, .], which, as discussed at the end of Section 3.4, is equal to F (up to padding extra zeros to each hash).
It remains to show that k-bad matchings are highly unlikely. Lemma 4.0.4 does exactly this. It shows that for sufficiently random R and o = Ω(log n k ) with high probability no k-bad matching exists. We start by showing that a distribution whose bias is exponentially small in k log n k suffices to avoid a k-bad matching with high probability. This is sufficient to guarantee the correctness of Algorithm 1. We furthermore shows how to extend these arguments to much lower quality distributions with a polynomially large bias. Since this second part is important for our derandomization but not needed to understand our main result we defer this second part to the appendix. Proof. Suppose for sake of simplicity that R is sampled from iid uniformly random bits. In this case the probability for any individual sub-strings of F to have a bad hash is 2 −o . Furthermore, for a fixed k-bad matching the probability that all matching pairs are bad under hash is 2 −ok .
There furthermore exist at most
) ways to choose the indices for a potential k-bad matching and therefore also at most 2 O(k log n k ) many such matchings. Taking a union bound over all these potentially bad matchings and choosing the constant c large enough this guarantees that the probability that there exists a k-bad matching is at most 2 −ok · 2
Next we argue that the same argument holds if R is 2 −cok -biased. In particular, for every kmatching determining whether it is a k-bad matching only depends on the outcome of ok linear tests on bits from R. For each of the 2 ok different outcomes for these tests the probability deviates at most by 2 −2ok from the setting where R is sampled from iid uniformly random bits and is therefore still at most 2 −ok + 2 −2ok = 2 −Ω(ok) . The same union bound thus applies.
Algorithm 2: Using Constant Size Hashes
In this section we give a more sophisticated and even more robust recovery algorithm. Surprisingly this algorithm works even if the hash size o used in the summary computations is a merely a small constant, leading to our main result, the order optimal document exchange hashing scheme.
The main difference between Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 is that we take matchings of previous levels into account and restricting ourself to k-plausible monotone matchings. This is sufficient to reduce the problem to a Hamming type problem on how to communicate the next level of hashes when most of them are already known to the receiver. However, here we cannot use systematic error correcting codes anymore but need to develop more efficient techniques. 
Algorithm 2 Randomized Recovery with o = O(1) and Summary Size
M ℓ+1 ← M l + ∆ ℓ (and split all edges into two making it a (ℓ + 1)-level matching)
⊲ Recover level ℓ + 1 hashes
7:
Recover H F [ℓ+1, .] by using the substrings matched in M ℓ+1 , guessing Θ(k) incorrect hashes and their values, and verifying correct guesses with hashes in S F
We note that the matchings M ℓ produced by Algorithm 2 are not necessarily monotone and not neccesarily disjoint, i.e., they can contain matches to overlapping intervals in F ′ . At the beginning or end of an iteration the matching might even be a non-proper level ℓ matching in that there can be matches which stem from matching level (ℓ − 1) hashes but do not have matching level ℓ hashes. At the beginning of an iteration such matches are removed making the matching proper. In order to analyze the progress of Algorithm 2 we introduce the following notion of an okay matching: Definition 4.0.1. We say a level-ℓ non-disjoint non-monotone non-proper matching M ℓ at the beginning of an iteration of Algorithm 2 is okay if there are at most 5k unmatched hashes or bad matches, i.e., matches between intervals in F and F ′ that are not-identical.
We can now prove that each iteration of Algorithm 2 works correctly with exponentially high probability in k, as long as it starts with an okay matching and as long as randomness in R is independent between levels and sufficiently unbiased: Lemma 4.0.5. Suppose the randomness in R is at most exp(−ok)-biased and independent between levels, where o > 1 is a sufficiently large constant. If, at the beginning of iteration ℓ of Algorithm 2, the matching M ℓ is okay and H F [ℓ, .] has been correctly recovered then, with prob 1 − exp(−ok), the matching M ℓ+1 is also okay.
Proof. We want to bound the number of unmatched and bad matches in the matching M ℓ+1 produced by iteration ℓ of Algorithm 2. By assumption M ℓ is okay and thus has at most 5k unmatched or bad matches.
The number of unmatched hashes in M ℓ+1 is easily bounded. In particular, for any unmatched hashes there exists a k-plausible disjoint monotone matching which leaves at most k hashes unmatched, namely the one which matches all blocks in F that do not have an edit in it. This is in particular true for the hashes that are unmatched after the matching M ℓ has been cleaned up and transformed into a proper level-ℓ matching in Step 4 of Algorithm 2. Since ∆ ℓ is the largest such matching it leaves at most k hashes unmatched, which split into at most 2k unmatched hashes in M ℓ+1 in Step 6 of Algorithm 2.
Next we bound the number of bad matches in M ℓ+1 . There are two potential sources for bad matches, namely, they can either stem from bad matches in M ℓ that are not identified as bad matches by H F [ℓ, .], or they can be newly introduced by the matching ∆ ℓ .
The expected number of bad matches of the first type is at most 5k · 2 −o · 2 since each of the at most 5k bad matches in the okay matching M ℓ has a non-matching hash in H F [ℓ, .] with probability 2 −o and gets split into two potentially bad matches in M ℓ+1 if it goes undetected. The probability that this happens to more than k/2 matches leading to more than k bad edges of this type in M ℓ+1 is at most exp(−ok) even if the probabilities in R are exp(−ok)-biased.
Next we want to argue that, with probability 1 − exp(−ok), the matching ∆ ℓ introduces at most k new bad matches which get doubled into at most 2k bad edges in M ℓ+1 . For this we first bound the number of possible ∆ ℓ matchings, given a fixed okay M ℓ matching, by exp(k), and then take a union bound. To count the number of possible ∆ ℓ matchings, given a fixed okay M ℓ , we specify such a matching by indicating which of the at most 5k unmatched hashes in M ℓ are matched and what the offsets of their starting positions is. Since
e., the sum of the differences between these offsets, is at most k for every kplausible matching the values and signs of these offsets can take on at most exp(k) different values.
Overall there are therefore at most exp(k) different possibilities for ∆ ℓ given M ℓ . Furthermore, the probability for any fixed such matching to be contain k bad matches is at most exp(−ok), if the randomness in R is independent from M ℓ and at most exp(−ok)-biased. A union bound over all exp(k) possibilities for ∆ ℓ thus shows that with high probability at most exp(k − ok) = exp(−ok) there is no ∆ ℓ matching which introduces more than k new bad matches.
Overall, with probability 1 − exp(−ok), this leads to at most 5k unmatched hashes or bad matches in M ℓ+1 at the end of iteration ℓ of Algorithm 2, making it an okay matching as desired.
Lemma 4.0.5 shows that our improved matching procedure in Algorithm 2 is robust enough to tolerate hashes of constant size o = Θ(1). In fact, it guarantees that given an okay matching for level ℓ and the correctly recovered hashes for level ℓ a finer grained matching for level ℓ − 1 is computed which is okay, i.e., which allows all but 5k hashes of level ℓ + 1 to be guessed correctly. Algorithm 2 thus achieved the crucial feat of reducing the edit distance document exchange problem to its much simpler Hamming type equivalent in which two parties hold a long string differing by at most 5k Hamming errors and one party wants to help the other learn its string.
Impossibility of Reconciling 5k (Worst-Case) Hamming Errors or Erasures with
o(k log n k ) bits In Algorithm 1 the reduction to the Hamming problem was all that was needed. There, too, the recovery algorithm found a guessH[ℓ + 1, .] for H[ℓ + 1, .] which differed by at most O(k) hashes. Both of these strings of hashes were over an alphabet of o = log n k bits and one could then simply use the error correcting code idea of [15] to recover H[ℓ + 1, .] fromH[ℓ + 1, .] using Θ(ko) = Θ(k log n k ) bits of additional information which could be put into S F . Concretely, we used the non-systematic part of a systematic linear [4k2 ℓ + 100k, 4k2 ℓ , 11k] error correcting code over F 2 o to send the equivalent of O(k) hashes and recover the position and correct value for the 5k hashes differing between the matching generated guess and the true hashes.
Unfortunately however for o = Θ(1) such error correcting codes cannot exist and in fact it is easy to verify 7 that it is impossible to reconciliate two parties holding n long strings over some alphabet Σ differing in any k positions without sending at least Θ(k · (log n k + log(|Σ| − 1))) bits because the position of the differences can already encode log n k = Θ(k log n k ) bits. For the encoding used in S F this implies that either Θ(k log n k ) bits need to be put into S F per level to allow the recovery of the Θ(k) bad or missing hashes, as we do in Algorithm 1, or one needs to have a better understanding of the distribution of the bad and missing hashes together with a better coding scheme which exploits the lower entropy in this distribution to communicate efficiently by using only Θ(1) bits per bad hash to describe its position and correct value. This is what we do in the next.
Our strategy to reconciliate the Hamming distance between the guesses for the level ℓ + 1 hashes stemming from the okay level ℓ matching and the correct values H[ℓ + 1, .] is to use the statistical distribution of bad hashes induced by random hash collisions to first guess the position of these bad hashes.
We remark that even if one would be able to identify all O(k) positions with incorrect hashes the recovery of the correct hash values still remains a hard problem because these positions are not known to the sender or respectively the party preparing the summary S F . Interestingly, and maybe somewhat counter-intuitively, solving this O(k) erasure problem deterministically using O(k) bits of communication is impossible, despite the fact that the positions of differences are known to the receiver (but not the sender). The argument above that k log n k bits are learned by the receiver and therefore need to be communicated falls away for this setting because only Θ(k) bits of information (namely the correct values) are learned by the receiver in the end. Still, any solution which allows to deterministically recover from the correct values for any k erasures induces a coloring of all n symbols strings which must produce a different output or color for any two strings that have Hamming distance k. If this was not the case the output of the sender would be the same for two strings of Hamming distance at most k and the receiver would not be able to determine which is the correct recovery if all k positions of their differences are erased. In short, even to recover from k erasures a Hamming code with distance k + 1 is induced which then in turn could be used to recover from any k/2 corruptions as well, where by argument above clearly Θ(k log n k ) bits of communication are necessary.
Understanding the Distribution of Bad Hashes
The above shows that indeed a better understanding of the distribution of bad hashes is required. In essence we will show that typically these bad hashes are concentrated enough in their occurrences to end up with a sufficiently small number of guesses, which furthermore can be efficiently generated and verified.
Suppose we have run Algorithm 2 for ℓ iterations. As proved in Lemma 4.0.5 with high probability in each level the matching ∆ ℓ adds at most 5k new guessed substrings. These substrings get split in two in every level thereafter or eliminated if non-matching hashes reveal that a guess was wrong. Each such substring in level ℓ can thus be classified by the level ℓ ′ ≤ ℓ its first ancestor was generated, which of the at most 5k substrings in level ℓ ′ this ancestor was, and which of the at most 2 ℓ−ℓ ′ substrings stemming from this ancestor it is. In particular, for each ℓ ′ the guessed substrings are naturally organized by having ≤ k binary trees of depth ℓ − ℓ ′ for each level ℓ ′ ≤ ℓ.
If a guessed substring is discovered to be incorrect despite earlier hashes including it indicating otherwise then all hashes that included this substring in earlier levels failed. Since each of these hashes fails independently with probability exp(−o) having a substring from level ℓ ′ be discovered to be wrong has probability exp(−(ℓ − ′ l)o). Of course there are also more of these substrings, namely up to 5k2 ℓ−ℓ ′ of them. Given that o is sufficiently large a union bound shows that one still expects most failures to be among the substrings generated in the most recent iterations, which therefore have not been tested by hashes quite as often. Indeed we will show that this effect and its concentration is strong enough to generate a sufficiently small number of guesses for the position of the incorrect substrings. In particular, let's suppose for simplicity that the incorrect substrings solely stem from the last constant number of levels. This would mean that there are only Θ(k) candidates and in order to select any 5k of them would lead to
= exp(−k) many possibilities to test. For each such possibility one guess the correct hashes and verify this guess using a hash of H[ℓ, .] included in S F to recover all hashes correctly with probability 1 − exp(−ok).
Of course this is overly simplified because it is likely that at least some incorrectly matched substrings survive undetected for more than a constant number of levels. Trying to enumerate any possible Θ(k) set of substrings however would lead to n Θ(k) trials which would not be efficient and furthermore destroy the union bound for the subsequent testing. We thus have to enumerate the Θ(k) guesses more carefully and employ a more sophisticated analysis.
Enumerating Plausible Guesses Using t-Witnesses
We next define t-witnesses, which are a specially formated way of specifying some Θ(t) guesses. To specify a t-witness at level ℓ, i.e., a guess of at most Θ(t) substrings stemming from levels ℓ and above, we first specify a non-negative number for each of the last min{l, t} levels, i.e., for each integer 0 ≤ i ≤ min{ℓ − 1, t − 1} we specify an integer 0 ≤ b i ≤ t with the restriction that i ib i ≤ t. As we will describe later these b i essentially specify the number of extra substrings stemming from level ℓ − i for which our guessed hash is not matching the actual hash for the next iteration because the substring is incorrect but has gone undetected so far. To specify which substrings among those in this level those are we have for each integer 0
Lemma 4.0.6. For any t the number of t-witnesses is at most exp(t).
Proof. The condition 0≤i ib i = t implies that the sum of all b i is at most t. The number of possibilities to split up t tokens over at most t levels is at most 
Next we explain how a t-witness in level ℓ for t > Θ(k) encodes a set of at most i |B i | = i ⌊2t2 −i ⌋ + i b i = 4t + t substrings for a given matching M ℓ . Process the B i sets from the largest i to the smallest and process each j ∈ B i from the smallest to the largest. In particular, we start with the largest i for which B i is non-empty and select the smallest integer j ∈ B i . This specifies a leaf / substring from level ℓ in one of trees in level ℓ − i by simply taking the ⌈j/2 i ⌉th tree and selecting its ((j mod 2 i ) + 1)th leaf (counting leafs in cut-out subtrees as well). Any leaf can be specified this way given that there are at most k < t trees. Before continuing to process the next (larger) j (or smaller i if there is no further integer in the current B i ) we cut all nodes from the chosen substring to its root, creating at most i subtrees of smaller depth which we add to the corresponding layers. Overall there are at most 5t such cuts which produce at most one extra tree per level this guarantees that each level contains at most O(t) trees and at most O(t2 i ) substrings/leafs at the time the level is processed. The reason for the cutting is that each incorrect substring from a level ℓ − i tree corresponds to i failed hashes with the caveat that for two such strings these hashes might overlap. Cutting and reclassifying the cut-off trees and leafs/substrings as above makes sure that any substring specified by a j ∈ B i corresponds to i disjoint failed hashes.
It remains to show that by checking all t-witnesses for a sufficiently large t = Θ(k) suffices to indeed check all typical ways in which hashes fail. Lemma 4.0.7. For any t > Θ(k), the probability for a set of substrings to have non-matching hashes which requires a t-witness to describe it is at most exp(−ot).
Proof. In order for a specific substring in level ℓ − i to be incorrect the i hashes including it failed. The probability for this is exp(−io) and due to the cutting of overlapping hashes these probabilities are independent given independent hashes. Given the O((t + k)2 i ) substrings in level ℓ − i the expected number of substrings discovered to be incorrect in this level is (t + k) exp(−io) and the probability for |B i | ≤ ⌊(t + k)2 −i ⌋ + b i such substrings to exist is at most exp(−iob i ). The probability for a fixed t-witness to describe the substrings with non-matching hashes is thus i exp(−iob i ) = exp(−o i ib i ) = exp(−ot). Because, due to Lemma 4.0.6, the number of such t-witnesses is at most exp(t) and since o is a sufficiently large constant even the union bound t ′ >t exp(t ′ ) exp(−ot ′ ) over all witnesses of all size equal or larger than t is a geometric sum converging to exp(−ot). Therefore, checking all exp(k) many Θ(k)-witnesses suffices with probability 1 − exp(−ok) to find (a superset of) the positions of the substrings which have a non-matching hash in this level. Even trying all exp(o) 5 k possibilities for what the correct hash values are for each of these exp(k) guesses and verifying if it leads to a matching hash h i for the whole string of hashes works correctly because the probability that an incorrect guess has a matching hash h i is exp(−o ′ k), which even after a union bound over all exp(k) exp(ok) guesses is negligible.
Overall for any k ∈ Ω(log log n) ∩ O(log n) this makes Algorithm 2 correct and efficient since each of the O(log n) levels succeeds with probability 1 − exp(−ok) > 1 − log O(1) n and the number of guesses in each level one needs to try is at most exp(log n) = n O(1) . In the case of k < o(log log n) there are too many levels to simply do a union bound with the exp(−ok) failure probabilities for correctness and for larger k the number of guesses needed makes the algorithm inefficient. These two problems are handeled relatively easily as we show next. We first prove Theorem 2.1 for the case of small k, i.e., for k = O(log n):
Proof of Theorem 2.1 for k = O(log n). We first note that for o = O(1) the hashes in the summary S F are indeed of size O(ok log n k ) as desired. Furthermore, given the constructions for ε-biased distributions from [18] one can specify the randomness for each level using O(ok) bits or O(ok log n k ) across all levels. We thus overall have a summary size of O o (k log n k ) as claimed. It furthermore follows almost immediately from Lemma 4.0.5 that Algorithm 2 is a successful decoding algorithm with probability log n k · exp(−ok) as long as R is chosen independently from an exp(−ok) biased distribution for each level.
In particular, by induction on ℓ, each iteration starts with a correct H F [ℓ, .] and an okay matching M ℓ . This is true for ℓ = 0 because H F [0, .] is part of the summary of F used as an input and M 0 is the empty 0-level matching which consists of 4k unmatched hashes in F . For subsequent levels, we get from Lemma 4.0.5 that M ℓ+1 is also okay. This then leads to a guessH F (ℓ + 1, .) for the level ℓ + 1 hashes which is correct up to 5k hashes. With probability 1 − exp(−ok) these can be described by a Θ(k)-witness by Lemma 4.0.7. Guessing the correct hash values for this witness then leads to the correct hashes which is recognized by a matching of the hash h ′ i . The probability that among the other exp(k) many Θ(k)-witnesses each with exp(ok) guesses for their hash values there is an incorrect one which still matches
. In each level we thus recover the correct hashes H F (ℓ + 1, .) with probability 1 − exp(−ok). A union bound over all log n k levels then leads to a failure probability of at most log n k · exp(−ok). While this failure probablity is o(1) if k = ω(log log n) it is not quite as strong as the exp(k + log n) failure probability claimed by Theorem 2.1 and furthermore becomes meaningless for even smaller k. Therefore, for k < essentially negligible overhead in the recovery time. Furthermore, the probability that none of these runs successfully recoveres F is at most the probability that of having |U | failures in log n k trials in which each trial succeeds independently with probability exp(−ok), and thus at most
To see this we apply Lemma 4.0.5 as before until the first iteration fails, which happens with independent probability of exp(−ok) for each iteration. We then look at the run in which the first failed iteration is the first iteration which the matching process is simply replaced by a "guess" for ∆ ℓ and inparticular when this guess is the correct matching. The following iterations in this run again fail independently with probability exp(−ok). If we continue to replace all failing iterations in this run we end up with a correct run, unless more than |U | iterations fail independently.
Over all these runs we get at most some n log o √ o potential guesses for F . For each such guess we can check whether indeed a file F was recovered with ED(F ′ , F ) < k. Adding an independent random hash of F of size Θ(log n) to the summary S F and checking whether it matches with what was recovered is sufficient to ensure that the algorithm, with high probability, only terminates and outputs a recovery once the correct F is found.
Next we proof Theorem 2.1 for the case of large k = ω(log n). While here correctness and failure probabilities are not an issue, efficiency is. In particular trying all exp(k) guesses for Θ(t)-witnesses becomes super-polynomial and thus intractable. The approach to avoid this is based on simple sampling. Instead of trying to guess all Θ(k) substrings with non-matching hashes and then verifying them via the hash h ′ i we instead randomly put all substrings in k/ log n subsets. With high probability each subset contains at most O(log n) substrings that need correcting and the same arguments as before show that with high probability these can be specified with a Θ(log n)-witness. Trying the polynomially many such witnesses in each class and verifying them independently via separate hashes leads to a simple polynomial time computation which succeeds with high probability.
Proof of Theorem 2.1 for k = O(log n). In addition to the H-hashes in the summary S F which have size O(ok log n k ) as before some Θ(k) = Ω(log n) independent bits of randomness are added for each level which, using the ε-biased distributions from [18] are used to color each substring in each level with a uniformly random color between 0 and ⌈ k log n ⌉. For each level in S F there is furthermore a hash of size O(o ′ log n) bits added for each color class, hashing the string of hashes of the same color. Here o ′ >> o is a sufficiently large constant. The summary size remains O(k log n k ) bits as before.
The algorithm for recovery essentially also follows Algorithm 2 except that in order to recover the correct new set of level ℓ+1 hashes H F (ℓ+1, .) in iteration ℓ we consider each color class separately. In particular the algorithm enumerates all Θ(log n)-witnesses with substrings in a single color class c and all guesses for the correct hash values for them. Lemma 4.0.6 guarantees that there are only a polynomial number of such witnesses and thus a polynomial number of different guesses for the part of H F (ℓ + 1, .) colored with c. Which of these guesses is correct can be verified by the extra O(log n) size hash added to S F and this verification is correct with high probability. While it is clear that among the 5k bad substrings guaranteed by Lemma 4.0.5 there will be at most O(log n) in each color class with high probability given that any such string ends up in a specific color class c with probability log n k it remains to be shown that these substrings are, with high probability, described by a Θ(log n)-witness. This follows in the same way as the proof of Lemma 4.0.7: In order for a specific substring in level ℓ − i to be incorrect the i hashes including it must have failed. The probability for this is exp(−io). The probability to get colored c for a fixed c is furthermore independent and Θ( log n k ) giving an overall probability of log n k exp(−io). Among the O(k2 i ) substrings in level ℓ − i the expected number of substrings discovered to be incorrect in this level and be in color class c is thus log n exp(−io) and the probability for |B i | ≤ ⌊log n2 −i ⌋ + b i such substrings to exist is at most exp(−iob i ). The probability for a fixed O(log n)-witness to describe substrings with non-matching hashes is thus i exp(−iob i ) = exp(−o i ib i ) = exp(−o log n) = n −O(o) . For a sufficiently large t = Θ(log n) no such t-witness which describes substrings with incorrect hashes exists which means that all the substrings whose hashes need correcting can be described by a t ′ -witness with t ′ < t and are thus found and corrected by the recovery algorithm. Overall each iteration succeeds with high probability also giving the desired with high probability guarantee for the entire algorithm.
A Derandomizing Algorithm 1 -The Deterministic Document Exchange Protocol of Lemma 2.1.1
In this section we show how to derandomize Algorithm 1 and thus complete the proof of Lemma 2.1.1.
As a first important step we show that one can significantly weaken the requirements Lemma 4.0.4 puts on the quality of the randomness provided. In particular, the conclusion of Lemma 4.0.4 holds with high probability even if we use a (n −c )-biased distribution.
Lemma A.0.1. For every sufficiently large c ≥ 1 it holds that if o = c log n k and R is sampled from an n −2c -biased distribution of bits then for every level i the probability that there exists a k-bad matching of F under hash and R is at most n −Ω(c) .
In order to prove this we apply a trick very similar to the long-distance property in [13] used to derandomized synchronization strings. In particular, we show that we can restrict ourselves to use much smaller (sub-)matchings as witnesses:
. . , i ′ jk ′ are the indices for the j th such matching. Denote with
) the total length of the j th matching. Note that the total length of all these k ′ -bad matchings sums up to at most 2n. Therefore the shortest such matching is a k ′ -bad matching in F with the desired length bound of at most Proof of Lemma A.0.1. According to Lemma A.0.2 it suffices to prove that with high probability F does not have a k ′ -bad matching with the "length restriction" (
such that ok ′ = c log n. We again start with the case that R is sampled from iid uniformly random bits. The probability for any two sub-strings of F to have a bad hash is still 2 −o . Furthermore, for a fixed k ′ -bad matching the probability that all matching pairs are bad under hash is 2 −ok ′ = n −c . There furthermore exist at most n 2 ways to pick i k ′ and i ′ k ′ and at most
ways to pick the other 2k ′ − 2 indices given the length restriction for a total of n 2 · 2 k ′ log n k = n O(1) potentially k ′ -bad matchings satisfying the length restriction. Choosing the constant c large enough and taking a union bound over all these potentially bad matchings guarantees that, with high probability, no such matching is k ′ bad which due to Lemma A.0.2 guarantees that F does not have a k-bad matching. Given that our argument for one k ′ -bad matching (again, similar to Lemma 4.0.4) under a R sampled from iid uniformly random bits only depends on O(log n) linear test on bits from R sampling R instead from an (n −c )-biased distribution does not change the above argument.
The improvement of Lemma A.0.1 to polynomially biased random bits is particularly useful because there are simple constructions of such spaces with a polynomial size support which can be efficiently explored [18] . Because our definition of a k-bad matching in F only depends on R and F and is of the form of a monotone matching, as mentioned in Section 4.1 one can furthermore write a simple dynamic program which tests whether a particular R leads to a k-bad self-matching of F : Lemma A.0.3. Given F , R and o there is a simple polynomial time dynamic program which determines if there exists a k-bad matching in F under hash o R . Putting all the above together we get a deterministic hashing scheme with summary size of O(k log 2 n k ):
Proof of Theorem 2.1.1. Given F and k we set n = |F | and o = c log n k for some small but sufficiently large constant c. Take a construction of an |R| = no log n k long (n −c )-biased bit vector with polynomial support [18] . One by one (or in parallel) set R to be one of these bit vectors and run the algorithm from Lemma A.0.3 to test whether under R there exists a k-bad matching in F under R until one setting of R is found for which no such matching exists. The existence of such an R is guaranteed by Lemma A.0.1. The summary creation algorithm then uses this R and hash and o to create S F . It also adds the description of R to S F which is of size O(log n) given the polynomial size of the space. The recovery algorithm is now simply Algorithm 1. Furthermore, because there is, by construction, no k-bad matching Lemma 4.0.3 guarantees that Algorithm 1 indeed terminates correctly.
B Error Correcting Codes for Insertions and Deletions and Deterministic Document Exchange Protocols
Deterministic document exchange solutions are intimately related to error correcting codes for insertions and deletions (insdel codes). In this section we explain this connection, summarize the related work on insdel codes, and compare the new error correcting codes that came out of this work and [8] .
B.1 Related Work on Insdel Codes
Error correcting codes for insertions and deletions have been studied quite intensely recently [3] [4] [5] 10, 11, 13, 14, 20] (see also these surveys [17, 21] ). As we will show below, any single-round deterministic document exchange scheme with summary size s = Θ(|S F |) for edit distance Θ(k) is equivalent 8 to a systematic error correcting block code with redundancy Θ(s) which can correct up to Θ(k) errors. Through this equivalence one can derive a systematic insdel code with redundancy O(k 2 + k log 2 n) from the deterministic document exchange of Belazzougui [2] . A non-systematic code with redundancy O(k 2 log k log n) was given by by Brakensiek, Guruswami and Zbarsky [4] but this code is only efficient for constant k. Most other works on error correcting insdel codes [3, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20] have focused on the setting where a constant fraction of symbols have been corrupted, i.e., k = δn. In this setting the state of the art codes over large finite alphabets are the synchronization string based codes from [3] which achieve a rate arbitrarely close to the Singleton of 1−δ for any δ ∈ (0, 1). For binary codes it is not known what fraction of corruptions can be corrected for [5] but Guruswami and Li [10] and Haeupler, Shahrasbi and Vitercik [14] gave efficient codes for insertions and deletions with redundancy Θ √ δ log O(1) 1 δ · n for any sufficiently small constant δ.
B.2 New Insdel Codes
As mentioned above, efficient deterministic document exchange protocols are known to be equivalent to efficient, systematic error correcting codes for insertions and deletions. Via this equivalency the deterministic document exchange scheme from Lemma 2.1.1 directly gives the following near optimal, efficient, systematic error correcting codes for insertions and deletions which work for any k adversarial insertions and deletions with near optimal redundancy Θ(k log 2 n k log q + k). For completeness we provide the complete proof for this next:
Lemma B.0.1. For any n, any k < n, and any finite alphabet Σ of size q = |Σ| ≥ 2 there is a simple deterministic encoding algorithm which takes an input string X ∈ Σ n and outputs a systematic codeword C(X) ∈ Σ n+r consisting of X itself and r = Θ(k log 2 n k log q + k) redundant extra symbols and a deterministic decoding algorithm A dec such that for any X and any C ′ with ED(C ′ , C(X)) ≤ k we have A dec (C ′ ) = X, i.e., one can recover X from any corrupted codeword C ′ which is k-close to C(X) in edit distance.
Proof. To encode X we run the deterministic document exchange scheme from Lemma 2.1.1 for edit distance 2k to obtain the summary S X consisting of Θ(k log 2 n k ) bits which can be converted into O(k log 2 n k log q + k) symbols from Σ. If this is less than k symbols we pad it to be Θ(k) symbols long. Next we encode these O(k log 2 n k log q + k) symbols with any efficient error correcting block code E which protects against a constant fraction of insdel errors, which is at least 2k insdels. For this we can use [3, 10, 20] or [14] . This increases the size by at most a constant. Overall we use the r = O(k log 2 n k log q + k) symbols of E(S X ) as the non-systematic part of the encoding C(X). Recovery now is also simple. Given a corrupted codeword C ′ we interpret the first n symbols as a corrupted version X ′ of X and the last r symbols as a corrupted version E ′ of E(S X ). It is clear if ED(C ′ , C(X)) ≤ k then both E ′ and X ′ have edit distance at most 2k from E(S X ) and X respectively. This allows us to decode E ′ to S X and then use the document exchange recovery algorithm to recover X from X ′ and S X .
The insdel codes from Lemma B.0.1 improve over the error correcting code by Brakensiek, Guruswami and Zbarsky [4] with redundancy Θ(k 2 log k log n) which are efficient under the strong assumption that k is a fixed constant independent of n and codes from Belazzougui's derandomized document exchange scheme [1] which have a redundancy of Θ(k 2 + k log n). For the case of k = εn the near optimal redundancy of Θ(ε log 2 1 ε ) is a quadratic improvement over the codes of Guruswami et al. [10, 11] and Haeupler, Shahrasbi and Vitercik [3, 14] which have redundancy Θ( √ ε log 1 ε O(1) · n). The work of Cheng et al. [7] , which obtained Lemma 2.1.1 independently and simultaneously, developed the ideas behind the deterministic document exchange even further and obtain non-systematic insdel codes with redundancy O(k log n). Due to their non-systematic nature these codes do not correspond to a deterministic document exchange protocol. These beautiful codes but have the optimal redundancy for any k < n 1−ε .
